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ARTICLES
THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: RETHINKING SECURITIES
REGULATION AND THE CASE FOR FEDERAL MERIT
REVIEW
Daniel J. Morrissey *
Financial services regulation has failed at its most basic task,
protecting the soundness of the system. '
I. INTRODUCTION: INADEQUATE FINANCIAL
REGULATION, PAST AND PRESENT
The severe recession that began in 2008 appears to have been
caused, at least in part, by the same failure of financial regula-
tion that contributed substantially to the Great Depression more
than seventy-five years earlier. As a congressional committee
found in 1933, "Whatever may be the full catalogue of the forces
that brought to pass the present depression, not least among
these has been this wanton misdirection of the capital resources
of the Nation."2 Back then, the state securities laws that had
come into existence in the preceding two decades proved power-
less to prevent fraudulent investment practices conducted on an
* Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. J.D., 1974, Georgetown Uni-
versity School of Law; B.A./B.S., 1971, Georgetown University. The author wishes to
thank Gonzaga Law student Jefferson Boswell for his assistance in the preparation of this
manuscript. He also would like to acknowledge the fine work of Vicky Daniels in helping
to produce the article.
1. Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., To Prevent Bubbles, Restrain the Fed, WALL ST. J., Nov.
17, 2008, at A19.
2. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2-3 (1933).
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interstate basis,3 and there were no national laws whatsoever re-
gulating the capital markets.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress reacted with the
passage of two landmark pieces of financial legislation: the Secur-
ities Act of 19334 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 5 While
the former required pre-sale registration of securities,6 the latter
more broadly regulated the securities industry and set up a re-
gime compelling ongoing disclosure by large, publicly traded
firms.7 Although some critics on the left said those measures did
not go far enough to assure the financial well-being of the nation, 8
they seemed to work well enough in the decades of prosperity
that followed the Second World War.9 During the last three dec-
ades, however, conservative critics have claimed that much of this
legislation not only was unnecessary to protect investors, but also
hampered capital formation by businesses.1° In response to those
pressures, Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ("SEC" or "the Commission"), the federal agency set up to en-
force and administer those laws, progressively deregulated the fi-
nancial markets."
As a result, far too much debt was packaged in exotic securi-
ties. 12 Additionally, ill-informed investors began to blindly specu-
late in those complex, privately traded instruments, many of
which were connected to an inflated housing market. When the
housing bubble burst, it took surprisingly little to destabilize the
world market for debt securities. The resulting collapse of com-
mercial credit wreaked havoc on the economy."1 It not only en-
3. See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure Sys-
tem, 9 J. CoRp. L. 1, 22-23 (1983).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2006).
5. Id. §§ 78a-78nn.
6. See id. § 77e(c).
7. See id. §§ 78b, 781, 78m(a), 78q.
8. See, e.g., William 0. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521, 522-23
(1934).
9. As Joel Seligman, the current president of the University of Rochester, noted,
"The revival of a strong new issues market in the post-World War II period, however, un-
dercut arguments that the mandatory corporate disclosure system or its enforcement by
the SEC in any significant sense obstructed new securities flotations, at least by large cor-
porations." Seligman, supra note 3, at 2.
10. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 175-86 and accompanying text.
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dangered the livelihoods of wealthy investors, but also those of
almost everyone else. At great potential cost to future prosperity,
the federal government then had to borrow huge sums to bail out
shaky financial institutions and re-stimulate a shell-shocked
monetary system.14
Perhaps economic historians will eventually explain in com-
plete fashion how an apparently thriving economy could come so
quickly to a near meltdown. 15 In the meantime, policymakers
must reach some provisional understanding of what caused this
fiscal debacle and what legal measures should be taken to make
sure such events never recur. Chief among those considerations
must be a new analysis of the laws governing our capital mar-
kets. This analysis must include a reassessment of the laws first
put in place in the 1930s and a rethinking of how they have been
applied over the succeeding seventy-five years, particularly dur-
ing the deregulatory zeal of the last three decades.16
This is a large project, even more so now that the capital mar-
kets are huge and globally interconnected. At its inception, how-
ever, our nation's system of financial regulation had a significant
shortcoming. By adopting disclosure as the underlying philosophy
of the federal securities laws, the framers of that legislation put
too much faith in the prudence of investors and the self-policing
mechanisms of the capital markets. As such, they passed up the
opportunity to exercise more meaningful control over the quality
of issued securities by a regime of merit regulation. 17
The weaknesses in such a half-measured approach were com-
pounded when even that flawed system of financial regulation
was undermined by an expansion of the exemptions to its central
requirement, i.e., that securities first be registered before they
are sold. 8 In addition, those defects became more acute in recent
14. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
15. For instance, Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman has already pointed
out that the credit collapse was compounded by America's huge borrowings from nations
like China, which created an illusion of wealth. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Revenge of the
Glut, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, at A23.
16. As one commentator aptly put it, "For three decades now, the American economy
has been in ... the Age of Reagan. The government has deregulated industries, opened
the economy more to market forces, and above all, cut income taxes." David Leonhardt, A
Free-Market-Loving, Big-Spending Fiscally Conservative Wealth Redistributionist, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008 (Magazine), at 28.
17. See infra notes 225-41 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 38-71 and accompanying text.
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years as highly complex and speculative investments gained
prominence in the capital markets. 19
As a prelude to proposing that a merit-based system of securi-
ties regulation replace the current disclosure-based laws, this ar-
ticle will present two premises for that proposition. First, it will
describe how deregulation undercut even the modest protection
that the existing system afforded investors and, in doing so, jeo-
pardized the soundness of our entire capital markets. 20
Second, the article will examine the most prominent of those
new financial arrangements: credit derivatives, collateralized
debt obligations, and credit default swaps. 21 The values of these
securities are obtained from other investments and contingent on
factors unknowable to their holders. When questions finally arose
indicating their diminished worth, a financial panic ensued.22 Not
only did their owners then see much of their portfolios wiped out,
but the whole country was pushed into a brutal recession leaving
ordinary citizens vulnerable to an economy badly strapped for
capital.
II. DEREGULATION HAS UNDERMINED THE MODEST
PROTECTIONS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. The Current Registration Requirement
As the Supreme Court aptly put it, the Securities Act of 1933
(the "Securities Act") was designed "to protect investors by pro-
moting full disclosure of information thought necessary to in-
formed investment decisions."23 Building on that premise, the
SEC has made this statement about the Securities Act's central
provision requiring registration of securities before they can be
offered and sold: "A primary means of accomplishing these [inves-
tor protection] goals is the disclosure of important financial in-
formation through the registration of securities."24
19. See infra notes 72-130 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 38-71 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 72-130 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 175-86 and accompanying text.
23. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (citing A.C. Frost & Co. v.
Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941)).
24. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC
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The contents of a registration statement are prescribed by the
Securities Act. It must contain a prospectus providing specific
items of factual information to investors. 25 The SEC has promul-
gated specific regulations that govern the disclosures and forms
that the issuer must employ in this process.26
The completion of a successful registration is a complicated
matter requiring the skills of attorneys, accountants, investment
bankers, and the active cooperation of the issuer's officials. 27 The
prospectus must contain all the information called for by the SEC
regulations and forms.21 Such disclosure, however, is necessary
but not sufficient. The anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act
compel the revelation of all facts that an investor would consider
important in making a decision to purchase the securities, be-
cause a failure to do so may result in criminal 29 and civil penal-
Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http:/!
www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (alteration in original) (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
Supporting this is the Supreme Court's own acknowledgement that "[t]he registration re-
quirements are the heart of the Act ...." Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (1988) (altera-
tion in original).
25. Securities Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2006). "Prospectus" is defined broadly as,
among other things, any writing "which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of
any security." Securities Act § 2(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. §77b(a)(10).
26. The Securities Act empowers the SEC to prescribe further information for a regis-
tration statement. Securities Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a). Section 10(c) of the Securities Act
also gives the SEC such power in regard to the prospectus. 15 U.S.C.§ 77j(c). For such reg-
ulations, see Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01 to 210.12-29 (2009); Regulation S-K, id.
§§ 229.10 to 229.1208; Regulation C, id. §§ 230.400 to 230.498. See also id. §§ 239.0-1 to
239.800, for registration forms that are prescribed under the Securities Act.
27. For a thorough discussion of the registration process, see generally Carl W.
Schneider, Joseph M. Manko & Robert S. Kant, Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and
Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1981).
According to Professor C. Steven Bradford, the direct costs of registration consist of: "(1)
the direct expenses of preparing, filing and distributing the required disclosure docu-
ments, (2) the commissions and fees paid to underwriters and others selling the securities,
(3) the delay associated with registration, (4) the costs of maintaining the government reg-
istration system, and (5) other miscellaneous costs associated with registration." C. Ste-
phen Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933: An Economic Analy-
sis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591, 602 (1996). Professor Bradford also discusses other costs of
registration that he says are less direct and more difficult to quantify, such as having to
make public disclosure about one's business, and subjecting the company to filing periodic
and other reports with the SEC as required by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at
608-09.
28. See supra note 26. The SEC has summarized the essential facts that a prospectus
must contain as "[1] [a] description of the company's properties and business; [2] [a] de-
scription of the security to be offered for sale; [31 information about the management of the
company; and [41 [flinancial statements certified by independent accounts." U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, http://www.
sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm (alteration in original) (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
29. See Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (imposing criminal penalties on "any per-
2010]
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ties. 0 All this activity is directed toward the preparation of a doc-
ument that will satisfy the SEC's staff who may review it and
must typically accelerate its effective date before the issuer may
sell the securities. 31
For the last several decades, the SEC has been sensitive to
charges that the process of registration is unduly costly and bur-
densome on issuers, inhibiting the formation of capital and even
discouraging entrepreneurship32 In response, the SEC has
son who willfully, in a registration statement ... omits to state any material fact...
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. . . ."); Exchange Act § 32, 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (imposing criminal penalties on "any person who willfully and knowingly
makes, or causes to be made, any statement in... any undertaking contained in a
registration statement which. . . was false or misleading with respect to any material fact
30. See Securities Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) for a detailed list of those who may
be held civilly liable to purchasers for any material misstatements or omissions in an ef-
fective registration statement. See also Securities Act § 11(b), § 77k(b), for available affir-
mative defenses. These defenses, such as the "due diligence" defense of Section 11(b)(3) (15
U.S.C. § 77k), allow individuals to avoid liability if they can show that they met a specific
standard of knowledge or conduct with respect to the material misstatements or omis-
sions. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(analyzing the availability of the "due diligence" defense to various defendants in a securi-
ties class action).
Similar to Section 11 liability, Section 12 of the Securities Act imposes civil liability on
any person who offers or sells securities by means of written or oral communication con-
taining material misstatements or omissions. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2). Section 12, however,
only applies to a purchaser in a public offering. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561,
569-70 (1995). Section 15 extends liability to those in control of a person liable under sec-
tions 77k and 771. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (noting that a controlling person "shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person
to whom such controlled person is liable"). Notwithstanding these express remedies of Sec-
tions 11 and 12, courts have also long recognized an implied right of action for securities
fraud under Section 10(b) (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009)). Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 380 & n.10 (1983) (citing prior cases).
31. See Securities Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h. Section 8 provides for the acceleration of
the effective date by taking into account
the adequacy of the information respecting the issuer theretofore available to
the public, . . . the facility with which the nature of the securities to be regis-
tered, their relationship to the capital structure of the issuer and the rights of
holders thereof can be understood, and ... the public interest and the protec-
tion of investors.
Securities Act § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a). See also Securities Act Rule 461, 17 C.F.R. §
230.461(b) (2009) ("[Ilt is the general policy of the [SEC], upon request,... to permit acce-
leration of the effective date of the registration statement as soon as possible after the fil-
ing of appropriate amendments."). For more on this process of SEC review, see generally,
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 3.6-.7 (5th ed. 2005).
32. For a discussion of the burdens surrounding the registration requirements of the
Securities Act, see Stephen F. Gertzman, Note, A Primer on Private Offerings, 24 FLA. L.
REV. 458, 458-61 (1972).
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streamlined the process for small issuers33 and companies already
public,34 and initiated "shelf registration" so that companies may
register securities for later sales.35 Most recently, in 2005, the
SEC also substantially liberalized the activities that companies
may undertake while in registration.3 6
As Professor and former SEC Commissioner Roberta Karmel
has noted, however, the SEC's principal response to the criticism
that registration is too burdensome has not been to make it "more
user-friendly," but to expand exemptions to it so that issuers will
be able to avoid the process entirely.37 It is here that during the
past several decades the limited safeguards of the current system
have been substantially eroded.
B. The Private Placement Exemption and Regulation D
Not every offering of securities must be registered with the
SEC. Certain classes are deemed "exempt securities" in Section 3
of the Securities Act, 38 and certain specific transactions are freed
from the registration mandate by Section 4 . The SEC gives this
summary of the most common of these, placing them in four cate-
33. See Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 30,968 [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,439, at
62,165-66 (July 30, 1992) (repealing Form S-18 and replacing it with Form SB-2 in an ef-
fort to "facilitate capital raising by small businesses and reduce the costs of compliance
with the federal securities laws"); Additional Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act
Release No. 6996, Exchange Act Release No. 32,231 [1992-1993 Transfer Binder]
85,134, at 84,118-20 (Apr. 28, 1993) (adopting new registration statement Form SB-1 in
order to "facilitate financings by small business issuers ... and their compliance with the
reporting requirements"). See generally Bryan Vaaler, Financing a Small Business in Mis-
sissippi: A Practitioner's Guide to Federal and State Securities Exemptions, Part 1, 63
MIss. L.J. 129, 184-86 (1993) (explaining the standards for the use of Forms SB-1 and SB-
2).
34. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383,
Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, 1 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) at S-3 (Mar. 10, 1982)
("This action integrates the disclosure systems under the various federal securities laws
and simplifies and improves the disclosure requirements imposed under these systems.").
35. Securities Act Rule 415, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2009).
36. Securities Offering Reform 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,725-27 (Aug. 3, 2005). But see
Joseph F. Morrissey, Rhetoric and Reality: Investor Protection and the Securities Regula-
tion Reform of 2005, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 561, 605-07 (2007) (arguing trenchantly that the
SEC has gone too far with those reforms and is neglecting its mission of protecting inves-
tors).
37. Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation by Exemption: The Changing Definition of An Ac-
credited Investor, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 681, 681, 690 (2008).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2006).
39. Id. § 77d.
20101
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
gories: "[11 [plrivate offerings to a limited number of persons or
institutions; [2] [olfferings of limited size; [3] [i]ntrastate offer-
ings; and [41 [s]ecurities of municipal, state, and federal govern-
ments."40
The Commission then goes on to state, "By exempting many
small offerings from the registration process, the SEC seeks to
foster capital formation by lowering the cost of offering securities
to the public."41 Contrary to the SEC's implication, however, ex-
empt offerings are not required to be small-neither in the dollar
amounts they raise nor in the number of investors they involve.
The exemption for transactions "not involving any public offer-
ing," for instance-the so-called private placements of securi-
ties-literally contains no such limits on its applicability. 42 The
legislative history of the provision is rather terse, stating that it
is intended for situations "where there is no practical need for
[the Securities Act's] application or where the public benefits are
too remote."
4
The orthodox interpretation of the exemption comes from a se-
minal Supreme Court case, SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.4 There the
Court refused to impose a numerical limit on the number of offe-
rees or purchasers who could participate in a valid private place-
ment.4' Rather, the Court said the exemption exists for those who
can "fend for themselves," i.e., those who do not need the disclo-
sure compelled by a registration statement to make "informed in-
vestment decisions. '"46
The Court in Ralston Purina went on to give its opinion that
top-level officials of an issuer would be the type of individuals
that would be covered by the exemption because they would have
access to the type of information contained in a registration
statement.47 Early case law after Ralston Purina interpreted the
exemption narrowly, making it virtually inapplicable to offerings
made to non-institutional investors who were not top officials of
40. Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, http://www.sec.gov/answers/regis
33.htm (alteration in original) (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
41. Id.
42. See Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
43. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (1933).
44. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
45. Id. at 125.
46. Id. at 124-25.
47. Id. at 125-26.
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the issuer.4 It would have been better if that is where the law
had remained.
Instead, responding to promoters who wanted the exemption
broadened, the Commission began using its rulemaking authority
to create an administrative "safe harbor"--Rule 146-which
would allow these exempt offerings to be made to a broader class
of investors.49 These potential purchasers were said, in the lan-
guage of Ralston Purina, to "be able to fend for themselves" be-
cause of their wealth or financial sophistication. °
Even after the exemption for non-public offerings was broa-
dened by Rule 146, criticism continued that its criteria were still
overly technical and unduly burdensome to entrepreneurs. 51 Con-
gress, responding to the small business lobby, then added Section
4(6) to the Securities Act in 198052 to prod the SEC into further
liberalizing the private placement exemption.13 The change freed
offerings under $5 million from registration so long as they were
made only to "accredited investors."54
Congress defined that term to include certain financial institu-
tions and other persons that the SEC might so designate "base[d]
[on] such factors as financial sophistication, net worth, know-
ledge, and experience in financial matters, or amount of assets
48. See, e.g., SEC v. Cont'l Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 158 (5th Cir. 1972) ("The record
does not establish that each offeree had a relationship with [the issuer] giving access to
the kind of information that registration would have disclosed."); Hill York Corp. v. Am.
Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680, 689 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[The Securities Act's] exemptions
must be narrowly viewed.").
49. See Securities Act § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2006) (empowering the SEC to pro-
scribe rules and regulations to carry out provisions of the Act, and making good faith com-
pliance with those administrative pronouncements a defense to any civil liability imposed
by the Act); 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (2009).
50. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125.
51. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities
Act of 1933: Practical Foreclosure from the Capital Market, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1139, 1143
(1977) (concluding that "the [SEC] has failed horribly" in its attempt to alleviate the un-
certainty surrounding Rule 146); H. David Heumann, Is SEC Rule 146 Too Subjective to
Provide the Needed Predictability in Private Offerings?, 55 NEB. L. REV. 1, 9 (1975)
("[Wihat is needed is a major overhaul of Rule 146 with the purpose of providing greater
certainty as to the Rule's application."); Ellsworth A. Weinberg & Michael W. McManus,
The Private Placement Exemption Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 Revi-
sited, and Rule 146, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 201, 231-32 (1975) (outlining the pitfalls of Rule
146).
52. Securities Act § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6).
53. Karmel, supra note 37, at 686-87.
54. Securities Act §§ 3(b), 4(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b), 77d(6).
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under management... ."51 Taking its cue from that legislation, as
well as the deregulatory fervor of the Reagan administration, the
SEC replaced Rule 146 in 1982 with Rule 506 of Regulation D-a
new and expanded safe-harbor provision designed to cover not on-
ly private placements, but also other exemptions for small and
limited offerings.56
C. Enter the Accredited Investor
Regulation D's major innovation was the "accredited investor":
a category of securities purchasers who would automatically meet
the Ralston Purina criteria of being able to fend for themselves,
i.e., they would not need the disclosure compelled in a registra-
tion statement.57 According to former SEC Commissioner Roberta
Karmel, this new concept has created a "huge exemption[ ] from
[the SEC's] regulatory scheme" and helped create "an enormous
private placement market. '58 Included in the definition of that
term are not only certain institutional investors and insiders of
the issuer, but also individuals with net worths of at least $1 mil-
lion or annual incomes of at least $200,000 in each of the two
most recent years, with expectations of reaching that level in the
current year.59
Under Rule 506 then, the SEC allows an unlimited amount of
money to be raised from any number of accredited investors who
do not need to be supplied with any documentary disclosure.60
Registration is therefore unnecessary, according to the SEC's
Regulation D reasoning, if an investor meets certain minimum
net worth requirements. 6' Such individuals, regardless of their
55. Securities Act § 2(a)(15), id. § 77b(a)(15)(ii).
56. SEC Regulation D Limited Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33-
6389, 14 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 495 (Mar. 17, 1982).
57. See Karmel, supra note 37, at 686-87 (discussing regulatory reforms in response
to Ralston Purina).
58. Id. at 681-82.
59. Securities Act Rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2008). Net worth valuations
can include assets of both spouses. Id. Annual income may include any spousal income;
however, the threshold income level increases to $300,000 where joint income is relied
upon to reach accredited investor status. Id.
60. See id. §§ 230.502(b)-(c), 230.506(b). Subject to certain restrictions, nonaccredited
investors are also allowed to participate in Rule 506 offerings: there can be no more than
thirty-five of them; they have to be supplied with registration-like written information;
and they or their advisors have to be financially sophisticated. Id. § 230.506(b).
61. Id. § 230.501(a)(5).
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business acumen, are automatically considered able to "fend for
themselves" when it comes to purchasing securities. Some ques-
tioned, however, whether that is actually the case and correspon-
dingly, whether the SEC had gone beyond its statutory authority
in promulgating Regulation D.12
Ralston Purina interpreted the Section 4(2) exemption as re-
quiring that offerees be among "the particular class of persons
[who do not] need[ I the protection of the Act."63 Rule 506, howev-
er, focuses solely on purchasers of securities, dispensing with the
need for any inquiry into the suitability of those to whom the in-
vestment is offered.6 Ralston Purina also held that the exemption
was designed for those who "have access to the same kind of in-
formation that the Act would make available in the form of a reg-
istration statement." 5 Yet Rule 506 has no requirement that ac-
credited investors have such data available to them.66
Along those lines, case law following Ralston Purina held that
for the private placement exemption to be satisfied, all investors
must have access to the type of information that registration
would provide.67 Yet it does not follow that wealthy individuals
necessarily have such investment data. Even if they do, there is
no assurance that on their own they would have the sophistica-
tion to analyze it appropriately.6s Put starkly, it seems that with
62. Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption
Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 382
(1984) ("[Tlhe reforms adopted by the SEC .. .may overestimate the abilities of the pre-
sumably wealthy .... Experience indicates that the wealthy often do not have the sophis-
tication to demand access to material information or otherwise to evaluate the merits and
risks of a prospective investment. Consequently, they frequently fail to seek professional
advice . . . ."). The Madoff affair has proven the contemporary relevance of those remarks.
See infra notes 204-15 and accompanying text.
63. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125, 126 n.12 (1953) ("[Olne of the fac-
tors stressed in an advisory opinion . . . 'as significant [is] the relationship between the
issuer and the offerees.'" (quoting Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Factors to be
Considered in Determining the Availability of the Exemption from Registration Provided
by the Second Clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952,
10,952 (Jan. 24, 1935) (emphasis added)).
64. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2) (exempting offerings on the basis of the expected
number of purchasers, the accredited investor status of purchasers, or the sophistication of
purchasers).
65. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125-26.
66. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (requiring only nonaccredited investors to have
access to sufficient knowledge and experience to evaluate the potential investment).
67. Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1289 (4th Cir. 1978); Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt.
Corp., 545 F. 2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977).
68. See Warren, supra note 62, at 382.
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Regulation D the SEC was abandoning attempts to safeguard in-
vestors with a certain amount of personal assets from fraud.,
In the quarter century since its adoption, the SEC continued to
broaden that exemption. As late as the summer of 2007, for in-
stance, the Commission proposed, among other things, to expand
the definition of accredited investors to include individuals with
as little as $750,000 in "investment owned funds."70 As Commis-
sioner Karmel has suggested, the Commission was perhaps giv-
ing ground again on the scope of the registration requirement to
preserve its "jurisdictional grip and ideological purity with re-
spect to the regulation of initial public offerings."71 In other words,
to forestall the outright repeal of the registration requirement by
deregulatory zealots, the Commission seemed to be trying to ap-
pease them by permitting its death by a thousand cuts.
III. THE WORLD OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES
A. New, Complex Securities
In the last decade investment bankers and their lawyers began
producing new financial instruments.7 2 When combined with var-
ious deregulatory developments they produced a lethal mix for
the economy.7 3 These novel securities were called credit deriva-
69. Cf id. at 382 ("It is important to note that the categories of 'wealthy' investors
frequently include widows and orphans whose protection traditionally has been the sacred
trust of the SEC."). This is alarming given evidence of widespread investment fraud on the
elderly. See, e.g., Press Release, N. Am. Sec. Admr's Ass'n, NASAA Survey Shows Senior
Investment Fraud Accounts for Nearly Half of All Complaints Received by State Securities
Regulators (July 17, 2006), available at http://www.nasaa.org/NASAANewsroom/ Cur-
rentNASAAHeadlines/4998.cfm; Press Release, U.S. Senate Special Comm. on Aging,
Kohl Highlights Senior Investment Scams at Aging Committee Hearing (Mar. 29, 2006),
available at http://aging.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=268430 ("While seniors 60 and older
make up 15 percent of the U.S. population, they account for about 30 percent of fraud vic-
tims.").
70. See Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, 72 Fed. Reg.
45,116, 45,123-24 (Aug. 10, 2007) ("[Tlhe proposed alternative standards would not result
in a reduction in the number of investors eligible for accredited investor status; rather, the
standard is intended to ease issuers' threshold determinations and provide a possibly more
logical basis for them."). The SEC reasoned that the recommended reduction in the thre-
shold net worth requirements are motivated, in part, by proposed exclusion of the inves-
tor's primary residence from future net worth calculations. Id. at 45,124 n.88.
71. Karmel, supra note 37, at 681.
72. See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Deriva-
ties, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2007).
73. Cf id. at 1033 ("[C]ompanies that take on much of the risk.., have no relation-
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tives because their values were based on debts owed to others. 74
Unlike plain vanilla lending agreements where a borrower issues
credit instruments such as bonds or debentures as evidence of its
debt, these investment contracts were made by parties who were
not involved in the original lending transactions.7 5
Those arrangements ostensibly arose to provide more sophisti-
cated risk management for firms and investors.76 Originators of
loans could sell them to others or make contracts protecting
themselves in case of default by their borrowers-thus laying off
their exposure to loss.7 7 In addition, those sellers could enhance
their liquidity by getting fresh cash for their loans, enabling them
to originate new loans more rapidly.78 Purchasers of those securi-
ties were also said to gain by having new, fruitful investment op-
portunities. 79
As recently as 2005, no less a sage than Alan Greenspan was
extolling those developments, saying that "the growing array of
derivatives and the related application of more-sophisticated me-
thods for measuring and managing risk [has] been [a] key fac-
tor ] underlying the remarkable resilience of the banking system,
which [has] recently shrugged off severe shocks to the economy
and the financial system."80 Greenspan then went on to urge Con-
gress not to regulate this derivative market so that it could con-
tinue to grow and innovate.8 ' By the same token, he added that
ship with the borrower and are less skilled and experienced in evaluating risk. Overall
this situation suggests that [use of credit derivatives] . . . can lead to moral hazard on the
part of borrowers who are subject to less financial discipline from their lenders.").
74. See Jongho Kim, Can Risks Be Reduced in the Derivatives Market? Lessons from
the Deal Structure Analysis of Modern Financial Engineering Debacles, 6 DEPAUL BUS. &
COM. L.J. 29, 29 n.5 (2007).
75. As one astute commentator said about the complex nature of these arrangements,
It is difficult for civilians to understand a derivatives contract, or any of a
range of closely related instruments, such as credit-default swaps. These are
all products that were designed initially to transfer or hedge risks-to pur-
chase some insurance against the prospect of a price going down, when your
main bet was that the price would go up.
John Lanchester, Melting into Air, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 10, 2008, at 80, 83.
76. See Kim, supra note 74, at 31.
77. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 72, at 1023-24.
78. See id. at 1024-25.
79. See id. at 1025.
80. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Risk Transfer and Financial Stability
(May 5, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.govboarddocs/speeches/
2005/20050505/default.htm) (alteration in original).
81. See id.
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"the history of the development of these [credit derivatives] en-
courages confidence that many of the newer products will be suc-
cessfully embraced by the markets."2
These credit derivatives were of two general kinds: collatera-
lized debt obligations ("CDOs") and credit default swaps
("CDSs"). 3 The former were a type of securitized asset, generally
structured as complex mortgage-backed securities. 84 The latter
were contracts, which functioned like an insurance policy against
default on a loan.85 They typically provided that if such a situa-
tion occurred, the party who sold this protection would have to
pay the principal of the loan to the other party who had bought it
as a safeguard against that possibility.86 The two forms became
connected when a CDO was not constructed so as to provide cash
flow from actual assets, but rather as a "synthetic CDO" whose
income was derived from selling protection on a loan which un-
derlies the CDS.87
B. Collateralized Debt Obligations
CDOs are a type of asset-backed security and as such are in es-
sence financial commodities.88 They are contracts that are mar-
keted to investors as offering payouts from an entity holding cer-
tain income-producing property.89 Such arrangements had their
genesis in the 1970s when the federal government chartered the
82. Id.
83. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 72, at 1019.
84. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
86. Id.
87. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 72, at 1031.
88. Mortgage-Backed Securities, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ti
mestopics/subjects/m/mortgage-backed-securities/index.html?offset=O&s=newest (last vis-
sited Dec. 18, 2009); Nathan Vardi, The Next Big Dump, FORBES, Dec. 8, 2008, at 36.
89. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 72, at 1019. The SEC has defined an asset backed
security, in part, as follows:
Asset-backed security means a security that is primarily serviced by the cash
flows of a discrete pool of receivables or other financial assets, either fixed or
revolving, that by their terms convert into cash within a finite time period,
plus any rights or other assets designed to assure the servicing or timely dis-
tributions of proceeds to the security holders; provided that in the case of fi-
nancial assets that are leases, those assets may convert to cash partially by
the cash proceeds from the disposition of the physical property underlying
such leases.
17 C.F.R. § 229.1101(c)(1) (2009).
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Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") to pur-
chase residential loans from their originators and issue bonds to
investors, promising pay-outs that ultimately came from the
home-owner/borrowers.9° These early mortgage-backed securities
had the beneficial result that was intended by their creator, the
United States government.9 1 They increased the money available
for borrowers to buy homes and spread the risk of their default.92
They were considered safe investments, not only because they
were secured by valuable residences, but also because they had
the implicit guarantee of the federal government.9 3
This process of backing securities with income-producing prop-
erties crossed over to the general world of finance during the
1990S9 4 when creative investment bankers began taking income-
generating assets, such as credit card receivables and auto loans,
and bundling them into packages5 They then sold them to a spe-
cially created entity that would issue securities based on their
payouts.9 6 Like mortgage-backed securities, those new arrange-
ments were touted as providing an immediate, fresh source of
capital for the original lenders 9 7 while providing investors with
new products that would furnish them bountiful income
streams.99
In the real estate boom of this decade, however, the market for
mortgage-backed securities boomed and those arrangements
morphed into more complicated CDOs.9 9 Bankers would set up
special purpose entities ("SPEs") to acquire various loan portfolios
secured either by parcels of real estate or by corporate debt.10
They would then sell securities issued by the SPEs in various
segments called tranches, which would be rated according to the
90. Nomi Prins, The Risk Fallacy, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2008, at 112.
91. Mortgage-Backed Securities, supra note 88.
92. Id.
93. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Mortgage-Backed Securities, http://
www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
94. Prins, supra note 90.
95. See, e.g., DWIGHT ASSET MANAGEMENT CO., FIXED INCOME PRIMER: ASSET-BACKED
SECURITIES 1 (2005).
96. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 72, at 1027.
97. Id. at 1025; Mortgage-Backed Securities, supra note 88.
98. Mortgage-Backed Securities, supra note 88.
99. See id.
100. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 72, at 1027.
20101
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
quality of the assets supporting them."' Different tranches would
thus, in theory, bear different risks. Typically, however, the
bankers would arrange to have purportedly independent rating
agencies certify all but the most junior tranches as investment
quality.102 "Billions of dollars in these instruments were [thus]
sold and resold," usually to institutional investors.10 3
This financial engineering was said to have benefits that
"'complete[dl' the markets" by giving investors a wide array of
choices of purportedly high-yield securities. 0 4 The bankers used
mathematical formulae that offered state-of-the-art precision to
predict defaults and recovery rates. 10 The mathematical formulae
were also used to explain how particular tranches had more value
than the aggregated value of their component mortgages. 10 6 This
arbitrage arose, some asserted, because either the underlying as-
sets were originally mispriced or the weaker ones would have
more value when mixed with stronger properties. 107 One commen-
tator fancifully compared this financial alchemy to the ability of
"a pastry chef [to] take a motley assortment of old fruit and turn
it into a delicious pie." °5
For these organizational services and for continuing to manage
the underlying collateral, the bankers'019 and their lawyers gar-
nered substantial fees. 10 Such remuneration was justified by the
increased value those securities gave investors over direct pur-
101. Id. at 1027-28.
102. See generally Prins, supra note 90.
103. Mortgage-Backed Securities, supra note 88; see John Waggoner & Matt Krantz,
Weighing the Value of the Unwanted; Pricing Mortgage-Backed Securities Will Be Tough,
USA TODAY, Sept. 24, 2008, at lB.
104. See Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 72, at 1027.
105. Prins, supra note 90. Experts from the fields of science nicknamed "quants" mi-
grated to financial companies and began applying mathematical models to investing strat-
egies. The recent economic collapse however has proven that their theories are anything
but fool-proof, prompting Warren Buffett to wryly remark "beware of geeks bearing formu-
las." Dennis Overbye, They Tried to Outsmart Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, at
D1.
106. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 72, at 1029.
107. Id. at 1028.
108. Prins, supra note 90.
109. Id. But see Penny Crosman, Collateral Damage, WALL STREET & TECH., Dec. 1,
2008 (identifying the poor quality of management that the bankers provided for the va-
luing and managing of such collateral).
110. Until recently, major law firms in cities like New York and Chicago had half their
attorneys working on these "structured finance" operations. See Ameet Sachdev, Chicago
Law Firm Adds 100 in New York, CHICAGO TRIB., Dec. 23, 2008, at 23.
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chases of the underlying assets."' In addition, the bankers who
assembled the portfolios of assets held themselves out as having
special expertise in evaluating the collateral. They claimed it
would give investors the ability to increase their profits by pool-
ing their resources "with other investors to obtain a divided own-
ership interest in a diverse portfolio of bonds. 112
C. Credit Default Swaps
In its simplest form, a credit default swap is a contract that a
lender makes with another party providing that in the event of
the borrower's default, the other party will allow the lender to
trade the loan instrument to it for its full payment.1 3 In essence
then, a CDS is a form of insurance that a lender purchases to mi-
tigate the risk of a borrower's failure to pay back its loan.114 The
lender pays a fee to its counterparty who sells it this protection.
In the event of a default, the lender gets to swap its loan to the
counterparty who sold it the right to be indemnified by treasury
bills worth the full amount of the note." 5 If there is no default, the
seller/counterparty has made a profitable arrangement and the
original lender's payments diminish its profit on the loan.116
CDSs are therefore hedges, 117 and as such they were once called
"wonder[s] of modern finance."" 8 By the same token they were
hailed by Greenspan, among others, as needed shock absorbers in
our financial system. For instance, because many of the banks
lending to companies like Enron and WorldCom had such agree-
111. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
112. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 72, at 1030.
113. Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default
Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 175
(2007).
114. But see id. at 181-88 (explaining how credit default swaps are structured so as not
to come under regulation as insurance).
115. Martin Mayer, A Credit-Default Solution, BARRON'S, Nov. 24, 2008, at 41; see also
Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?, TIME, Mar. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.time.com/timelbusiness/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html.
116. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 72, at 1019. One commentator has noted that CDSs
are prime examples of "'asymmetric risk positions.' These are products or contracts that,
in general, generate small gains and very rarely have losses. But when they do have
losses, they are huge." As such, they can present a false picture of a money manger's per-
formance using conventional "Value-at-Risk" standards. Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanage-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009 (Magazine), at 24.
117. Schwartz, supra note 113, at 169.
118. Credit Derivatives: The Great Untangling, ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 2008, at 12.
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ments, they were said to have been able to limit their exposure in
those financial scandals. 1 9
The outstanding amount of CDS protection and liability has
grown from virtually nothing a decade ago, to an estimated $62
trillion at the end of 2007.120 Typical sellers have been banks, in-
surance companies, and hedge funds with the top twenty-five
banks being on either side of $13 trillion in these contracts at the
end of the third quarter in 2007.121 Such arrangements, however,
are not limited to actual lenders but can be entered into by any-
one who is interested in making a bet about the creditworthiness
of an entity. Along those lines, any investors can make or pur-
chase these contracts as speculative wagers on the direction of
credit spreads. 122
CDSs are all traded over-the-counter in private arrangements,
and thus no central platform or exchange monitors or records
these transactions.123 In addition, under the Commodities Futures
Modernization Act of 2000, it is illegal to regulate CDSs.124 In that
regard, Sections 2A(a)-(b) and 3A(a)-(b) 125 of the Securities Act
and the Securities Exchange Act, respectively, provide that CDSs
are not securities. But for that, they would easily come under the
"investment contract" definition of a security126 because in such
dealings, profit is expected solely from the efforts of others,127 spe-
119. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Before the Council on Foreign Re-
lations (Nov. 19, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2002/20021119/default.htm).
120. Credit Derivatives: The Great Untangling, supra note 118.
121. See Morrissey, supra note 115.
122. David Bogoslaw, Regulating Credit Default Swaps: Will It Work?, Bus. WK., Nov.
21, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/investor/contentnov2008/pi20081119
_756744.htm.
123. Id.
124. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox acknowl-
edged that in testimony before Congress calling the CDS market "completely lacking in
transparency and completely unregulated." Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Ac-
tions Regarding Government Sponsored Entities, Investment Banks and Other Financial
Institutions, Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
110th Cong. 2 (2008) (testimony of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1 (2006); id. § 78c-1. These provisions were part of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. The law's namesake and principal sponsor, former Senator Phil
Gramm, continues to defend the Act against charges that it contributed to the financial
meltdown. Phil Gramm, Deregulation and the Financial Panic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009,
at A17, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123509667125829243.html.
126. Securities Act § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); Exchange Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(10).
127. SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
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cifically the bankers who package, sell, and manage those ar-
rangements.
When CDSs were originally created in the strong economy of
the late 1990s, they were seen as lucrative and safe investments
when offered as swap protection to holders of municipal and cor-
porate bonds that rarely defaulted. 28 In recent years, however,
they have been more often sold to CDOs and freely traded among
banks, hedge funds,129 and other investors who did not know the
resources or potential liabilities of their counterparties or the
original obligors on those instruments.130
D. Easy Money, Inflated Real Estate, and Hedge Funds
A description of how these unregulated credit derivatives pre-
cipitated the economic collapse of 2008 is incomplete without
some further background on three conditions that enabled them
to become the tools for rampant risk-taking. Beginning early this
decade, unregulated pools of capital called hedge funds and other
investment firms borrowed huge amounts of money at very little
cost. Much of those resources were then used to buy high-yielding
CDOs backed by subprime mortgages, that is, loans made to ho-
mebuyers of questionable creditworthiness and secured only by
their overvalued residences.131
Fearing an economic slowdown after the dot-coin bust and the
9/11 attacks, the Federal Reserve Bank, under the leadership of
Chairman Greenspan, cut the key interest rate under its control
early in this decade from 3.5% to 1%, the lowest since the
128. Morrissey, supra note 115.
129. Id.
130. As one authority noted, even before the credit collapse of 2008,
[tihe market for credit default swaps is quite opaque.... Thickening the in-
formational fog still further is the frequency with which one of the original
parties sells its stake to someone else without notifying the other party. "Re-
cording-keeping, documentation and other practices have been so sloppy," as
a recent article put it, "that no firm could be sure how much risk it was tak-
ing or with whom it had a deal."
Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 72, at 1036.
131. See LAURIE S. GOODMAN ET AL., SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT DERIVATIVES 299-
300 (2008); PAUL MUOLO & MATTHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME: How WALL STREET
CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS 219-13 (2008).
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1950s. 1"' Only in 2004 did the Federal Reserve Bank begin raising
it; however, it did so slowly and only in small increments. 133
But early in the decade, a housing boom had already begun,
thanks in part to the repeal of capital gains taxes on almost all
home sales during the Clinton years3 4 and policies undertaken at
the onset of the Bush administration to encourage home owner-
ship. 135 Those factors, when coupled with historically low interest
rates, began "'fueling the mother of all housing bubbles. 1 36 Home
prices spiked to such a level that Time Magazine's cover on June
13, 2005, declared, "Home $weet Home: Why We're Going Gaga
over Real Estate. 1 7
With cheap money and home prices soaring, banks and other
mortgage-makers eased their lending policies, creating the "liar
loan" phenomenon where "mortgages [were] approved without re-
quiring proof of the borrower's income or assets.""" As one com-
mentator described the ensuing frenzy, "Families bought homes
they couldn't have afforded at higher interest rates; speculators
bought properties to flip; people with modest incomes or poor cre-
dit took out ... sub-prime loans, interest-only loans, and 'Alt-A'
loans."139
132. John Cassidy, Anatomy of a Meltdown: Ben Bernanke and the Financial Crisis,
THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 1, 2008, at 49, 52.
133. Id.
134. See Vikas Bajaj & David Leonhardt, 1997 Tax Break on Home Sales May Have
Helped Inflate Bubble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at Al.
135. See Jo Becker et al., Ambition of Bush on Housing, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 22,
2008, at 11.
136. Bajaj & Leonhardt, supra note 134 (quoting Vernon L. Smith, a winner of the No-
bel Prize for Economics).
137. See James Poniewozik, America's House Party: Record Home Prices Are Inflaming
Passions-and Pocketbooks-as Never Before: Inside Our Raucous Obsession with Real
Estate, TIME, June 13, 2005, at 16.
138. Associated Press, "Liar Loans" Threaten to Prolong Mortgage Mess: Mortgages Al-
lowed Without Proof of Pay, Assets Default in Record Numbers, Aug. 18, 2008, http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/26270434J. For a piece describing how the mortgage industry encour-
aged deceit in this practice, see Mark Gimein, Inside the Liar's Loan: How the Mortgage
Industry Nurtured Deceit, SLATE, Apr. 24, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2189576.
139. Cassidy, supra note 132, at 52. Michael Lewis provides a graphic description of
the worst of these loans:
They'd be in what Wall Street people were now calling the sand states: Ari-
zona, California, Florida, Nevada. The loans would have been made by one of
the more dubious mortgage lenders; Long Beach Financial, wholly owned by
Washington Mutual, was a great example. Long Beach Financial was moving
money out the door as fast as it could, few questions asked, in loans built to
self-destruct. It specialized in asking homeowners with bad credit and no
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Originators were hardly bothered by this lack of creditworthi-
ness because they were able to sell the loans they made to promo-
ters who bundled them to back CDOs that were sold by Wall
Street firms.14 ° Their ultimate purchasers were not just hedge
funds, but supposedly conservative institutions like government
agencies "hoping for fast gains to cover growing pension costs and
budgets without raising taxes ."141
Recent decades also saw the rise in such unregulated invest-
ment pools that were given the generic name of "hedge funds"
142
because of their supposed usage of diversified strategies to protect
their holdings. 1 3 For a time, these companies appeared to gener-
ate "alpha" profits for their investors, principally through bor-
proof of income to put no money down and defer interest payments for as long
as possible. In Bakersfield, California, a Mexican strawberry picker with an
income of $14,000 and no English was lent every penny he needed to buy a
house for $720,000.
Michael Lewis, The End, PORTFOLIO.COM, Nov. 11, 2006, http://www.portfolio.com/news-
markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/l1/1The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom/index.html.
Even George Bailey would not make a mortgage for such an applicant. See IT'S A
WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946) (a 1946 motion picture by Frank Capra that
starred Jimmy Stewart as George Bailey, a compassionate president of a building and loan
who helped working people buy homes).
140. See Cassidy, supra note 132, at 52. For two well-researched and written exposds of
how once reputable financial houses like Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns created this in-
vesting travesty, see generally MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 131; MARK ZANDI,
FINANCIAL SHOCK (2009).
141. Charles Duhigg & Carter Dougherty, From Midwest to M.T.A., Pain From Global
Gamble, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2008, at Al.
142. For a good explanation of why hedge funds were unregulated, see Sargon Daniel,
Hedge Fund Registration: Yesterday's Regulatory Schemes for Today's Investment Vehicles,
2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 247 (2007).
The SEC made an attempt in 2004 to require hedge fund managers to register under the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 under Rule 203(b)(3)-2 of that Act. 17 C.F.R. §
275.203(b)(3)-2(a) (2009). Advisors with fewer than fifteen clients were exempt from that
mandate but the SEC's modified rule would have "looked through" institutional entity in-
vestors to count each of their members as clients. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006). The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, struck down that interpretation of
the rule. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
143. THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS & OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION
AND COMPLIANCE § 1.1 (2008); see also STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM'N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, at 33-37 (2003).
Former SEC chairman William Donaldson called hedge funds the "'catch-all classifica-
tion for many unregistered privately managed pools of capital.'" Jessica Natali, Comment,
Trimming the Hedges is a Difficult Task: The SEC's Attempt to Regulate Hedge Funds
Falls Short of Expectations, 15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 113, 116 (2006). Fashioning perhaps
a more direct definition, one author has called hedge funds "private and largely unregu-
lated investment pools for the rich." ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE
AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 24 (2000).
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rowed funds to buy CDOs that offered hefty returns.'4 Companies
also gained what appeared to be easy income from selling CDS
protection.1 45 Managers of these funds charged their clients exor-
bitant fees, which sometimes totaled thirty-three percent of their
gains,'1 46 and structured those compensation arrangements so that
their income was only taxed at the capital gain rate of fifteen per-
cent rather than as ordinary income at thirty-five percent.4 7
In 2007, several hedge-fund operators made over an astounding
$1 billion in compensation each, 14 8 and at their height, there were
over 10,000 of those entities.' 4 As a public official said recently,
"'For the past five or six years, it seemed like anybody could go to
their computer and print up a business card and say they were in
the hedge fund business, and raise a pot of money'....,150
Nor did old-line established investment banks eschew those
speculative maneuvers. In 2004, they requested that the SEC loo-
sen the net capital rules that required their brokerage units to
maintain certain levels of reserves. 51 Leaders of those prestigious
institutions, including Henry Paulson, then-CEO of Goldman
Sachs, assured the SEC that their firms had the sophisticated
144. As one commentator wrote,
The new secret of accumulation was presumed to be leverage and risk man-
agement, which allowed ... the borrowing of many times the amount the in-
vestor had in equity capital-perhaps ten, twenty, thirty, or in some cases a
hundred times as much. When so highly leveraged, even a small rise in value
could return great profit on the initial investment.
William K. Tabb, Four Crises of the Contemporary World Capitalist System, MONTHLY
REV., Oct. 2008, at 43, 44-45.
145. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
146. John Cassidy, Hedge Clipping: Is There a Way to Get Above-Market Returns on the
Cheap? THE NEW YORKER, July 2, 2007, at 28.
147. See David Cay Johnston, Tax Loopholes Sweeten a Deal for Blackstone, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2007, at Al; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., An Unjustified Privilege, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2007, at A19. One formidable advocate for such privileges has been Senator
Charles E. Schumer. See Eric Lipton & Raymond Hernandez, A Champion of Wall Street
Reaps the Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at Al.
148. Jesse Eisinger, The Hedge Fund Collapse, PORTFOLIO.COM, Nov. 11, 2008, http:ll
www.portfolio.com/views/columns/wall-street/2008/11/11Collapsing-Hedge-Fund-Industry
/index.html.
For the author's views on the implications such excessive compensation has on concerns
of social justice, see Daniel J. Morrissey, American Catholics in the New Gilded Age,
AMERICA, Jan. 7-14, 2008, at 22.
149. Cassidy, Hedge Clipping, supra note 146.
150. Louise Story, Hedge Funds' Steep Fall Sends Investors Fleeing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2008, at Al (quoting Richard H. Moore, the treasurer of North Carolina).
151. See Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al.
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computer models needed to assess the riskiness of their portfo-
lios. 152 "Those funds," noted one observer, "could then flow up to
the parent company enabling it to invest in the fast-growing but
opaque world of mortgage-backed securities; credit derivatives, a
form of insurance for bond holders [CDSs]; and other exotic in-
struments.
' ' 1 3
The SEC's actions had their intended effects, with many in-
vestment banks substantially increasing their borrowing.4 The
firm of Bear Stearns, for instance, ultimately had thirty-three
dollars in debt for every one dollar it maintained in reserves.'55 In
exchange for its relaxation of the net-capital rules, the SEC in-
vited the banks to participate in a voluntary program to disclose
their investments-Consolidated Supervised Entities156-but it
had only spotty involvement by those firms and was given low
priority by the SEC.157
However, investors in CDOs and other exotic, unregulated se-
curities received assurance from apparently reputable agencies
that graded the quality of corporate debt-most often they certi-
fied those instruments as highly creditworthy., 8 It appears now,
however, that those firms were so handsomely paid for their rat-
152. See id.
153. Id. (alteration in original).
154. See id.
155. Id. Such outrageous speculation would not have happened if these bankers had
"skin in the game." According to prize winning author Michael Lewis,
The moment Salomon Brothers demonstrated the potential gains to be had by
the investment bank as a public corporation, the psychological foundations of
Wall Street shifted from trust to blind faith. No investment bank owned by
its employees would have levered itself 35 to 1 or bought and held $50 billion
in mezzanine C.D.O.'s. I doubt any partnership would have sought to game
the rating agencies or leap into bed with loan sharks or even allow mezzanine
C.D.O.'s to be sold to its customers. The hoped-for short-term gain would not
have justified the long-term hit.
Lewis, supra note 139.
156. Stephen Lebaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2008, at Al.
157. See id. On September 26, 2008, SEC Chairman Cox announced that the CSE pro-
gram would be abandoned because it was unsuccessful. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, State-
ment of Chairman Cox on IG Reports Regarding CSE Program (Sept. 26, 2008), http:l/
www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-231.htm.
158. See Gretchen Morgenson, Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at Al. As a report in the Wall Street Journal put it, "Most credit-
rating firms are paid by underwriters issuing the same debt they rate, and critics say they
had an incentive to give the debt products favorable ratings to win future business." Da-
mian Paletta & Kara Scannell, Ten Questions for Those Fixing the Financial Mess, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 10, 2009, at A10.
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ing services there that they "either underestimated the risk of
mortgage debt or simply overlooked its danger."s 9
Internal skepticism about the generosity of those investment
grades was ignored at the rating agencies. An email exchange be-
tween two analysts at one firm said it all. One wrote, "'That deal
is ridiculous,'. . . 'We should not be rating it.' 'We rate every deal,'
came the response. 'It could be structured by cows and we would
rate it.' ' 16° Another analyst wrote this in an email about securities
backed by subprime mortgages, "'Let's hope we are all wealthy
and retired by the time this house of cards falters.'11
Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman summed up all
these practices quite well:
Consider the hypothetical example of a money manager who leve-
rages up his clients' money with lots of debt, then invests the bulked-
up total in high-yielding but risky assets, such as dubious mortgage-
backed securities. For a while-say, as long as a housing bubble con-
tinues to inflate-he (it's almost always a he) will make big profits
and receive big bonuses. 62
IV. WALL STREET'S COLLAPSE AND THE MADOFF FIASCO
A. Unheeded Predictions
Professor Krugman, however, finished the description of his
hypothetical money manager with this conclusion, "Then, when
the bubble bursts and his investments turn into toxic waste, his
investors will lose big-but he'll keep those bonuses."163 That is
exactly what happened in the Great Meltdown of '08, which was
159. Morgenson, supra note 158.
160. Gretchen Morgenson, They're Shocked, Shocked About the Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 2008, at BU1; see also Lewis, supra note 139 and accompanying text.
161. Michael M. Grynbaum, Study Finds Flawed Practices at Ratings Firms, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2008, at C1.
162. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Madoff Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at A45.
163. Id. A recent commentator pointed out that almost a century ago the great corpo-
rate reformer and later Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis had described the same
type of reprehensible behavior on Wall Street. "Our current crisis, after all, was in part
fueled by bankers making big gambles with other people's cash. They bundled and sold
sub-prime mortgages, took their profits, and then left others holding portfolios full of
worthless, even toxic, paper. This was exactly the kind of behavior that Brandeis des-
pised." Melvin I. Urofsky, The Value of 'Other People's Money', N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, at
A21.
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precipitated by a drastic decline in the value of residential real
estate that backed many of the CDOs.
Michael Lewis tells the story of a skeptical market analyst who
knew of the untrustworthiness of sub-prime loans and tried to
figure out "how the rating agencies justified turning BBB loans
into AAA-rated bonds."164 Whenever he would talk to people at a
rating agency and ask what would happen to default rates if real
estate prices fell, he always got the same answer:165 the models
"for home prices had no ability to accept a negative number. 'They
were just assuming home prices would keep going up."166
No less an esteemed investor than Warren Buffett had been
warning for years about the dangers of financial derivatives. In
2003 he wrote, "'No matter how financially sophisticated you are,
you can't possibly learn from reading the disclosure documents of
a derivatives-intensive company what risks lurk in its posi-
tions.'1 67 The self-same sage of Omaha also prophetically called
CDOs "'financial weapons of mass destruction.""68
However, with Alan Greenspan both fueling the housing boom
with cheap money169 and actively discouraging any regulation of
financial derivatives, 70 it was difficult for any critics to point out
potential problems with "the Maestro's" rosy scenarios. 171 In 2004,
his last full year as Federal Reserve Bank Chairman, Greenspan
was saying that it was unlikely a housing bubble was building.7 2
In 2005, Greenspan's successor Benjamin Bernanke also denied
that the real estate market was inflated. 73 In addition, Bernanke
spoke out in May 2006 against regulation of hedge funds, saying
164. Lewis, supra note 139.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Lanchester, supra note 75, at 83.
168. See Mortimer B. Zuckerman, The Credit Crisis Grows, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Dec. 24, 2007, at 68. For others who predicted the collapse of economic meltdown,
see Lanchester, supra note 75, at 83-84; All Things Considered: The Man Who Predicted
the Economic Meltdown (NPR broadcast Dec. 4, 2008), available at http://www.
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?StoryId=97801606.
169. See Cassidy, supra note 132, at 52.
170. See Credit Derivatives: The Great Untangling, supra note 118.
171. Cassidy, supra note 132, at 53 (quoting William White, an economist for the Bank
of International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland who had been warning about credit and
real estate bubbles since 2003).
172. Id. at 52.
173. Id.
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such action would "stifle innovation" and praising the mathemat-
ical models those funds had developed "'for identifying, measur-
ing, and managing their risks. ' '174
B. The Death of Wall Street
It is now painfully apparent that Greenspan, Bernanke, and
almost the entire financial establishment were dead wrong. In
the succinct words of one commentator, "By extending mortgages
to unqualified lenders and accumulating large inventories of sub-
prime securities, banks and other financial institutions took on
enormous risks, often without realizing it.'' 5 Experts are debat-
ing whether this enormous overextension resulted from just a
failure of Wall Street's mathematical models or whether it was
attributable to something far worse: that the people responsible
for those "excessive and foolhardy" investments were recklessly
endangering the entire financial system.7 6
The latter view is the correct one. As one commentator has
stated, "Human beings did these things.'1 7 "Simply put, the lend-
ers lent with unimaginable foolishness and made incredibly risky
bets. And the bets busted."' 78 The housing bubble peaked in 2005
and 2006. As Greenspan himself admitted in later testimony to
Congress, "The whole intellectual edifice [of the theories behind
derivative pricing and risk management] ... collapsed in the
summer of [2007] because the data input into the risk-
management models generally covered only the past two decades,
a period of euphoria." 179
One English observer described the situation with greater pre-
cision:
[Als markets that were crucial for raising funds started to dry up [in]
August [2007], a network of financial vehicles slid into crisis, causing
the price of many debt securities to collapse. That[ ]started a chain
reaction that created liquidity and solvency crises at US and Euro-
174. Id. at 54.
175. Id.
176. See Nocera, supra note 116.
177. Ben Stein, You Don't Always Know When the Sky Will Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
2008, at BU7.
178. Ben Stein, Before the Fear, There Was Foolishness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at
BU8.
179. Nocera, supra note 116.
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pean banks[-]on a scale last seen in Japan almost exactly a decade
ago.
8 0
This concatenation of events seemed to culminate in the collapse
and fire-sale of Bear Stearns, a major investment bank, on St. Pa-
trick's Day weekend in 2008.111
After the rescue of Bear Stearns, the financial system appeared
to settle for a while. 18 2 In reality, however, the situation continued
to deteriorate since the market in mortgage-backed securities had
effectively collapsed the previous summer. All that was left of
that sector were two federally chartered corporations, Fannie
Mae and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie
Mac"). 8 3 When the shares of those two companies began to fall
precipitously in the summer of 2008, T14 the Federal Reserve Bank
at first announced plans to invest money in them to keep them a-
float.'18 By Labor Day, however, they stood so perilously close to
defaulting on their obligations that the U.S. Treasury announced
a complete government takeover.186
Yet this "finger-in-the-dike" strategy failed miserably just a few
days later when the major investment bank, Lehman Brothers,
started to go down. 187 This time there was no government-
sponsored rescue plan. As the Wall Street Journal put it, "It was
a weekend unlike anything Wall Street had ever seen: In past
crises, its bosses had banded together to save their way of life.
This time, the financial hole they had dug for themselves was too
180. Gillian Tett, The Big Freeze: A Year That Shook Faith in Finance, FINANCIAL
TIMES (London), Aug. 3, 2008.
181. For a good description of the unfolding of these events, see Kate Kelly, Lost Oppor-
tunities Haunt Final Days of Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2008, at Al. Just days
before that firm's collapse, SEC Chairman "Christopher Cox was told by his staff that
Bear Steams had $17 billion in cash and other assets-more than enough to weather the
storm." Labaton, supra note 151. Cox's misinformation was a result of the SEC's own ac-
tion in 2004 that relaxed the amount of capital investment firms like Bear Stearns had to
maintain in reserves. Id.
182. Cassidy, supra note 132, at 60.
183. Id. at 60-61.
184. James R. Haggerty, Deborah Solomon, & Damian Paletta, U.S. Mulls Future of
Fannie, Freddie-Administration Ramps Up Contingency Planning As Mortgage Giants
Struggle, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2008, at Al; see also Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take
More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at Al.
185. Cassidy, supra note 132, at 61.
186. James R. Hagerty, Ruth Simon & Damian Paletta, U.S. Seizes Mortgage Giants,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2008, at Al.
187. Cassidy, supra note 132, at 61-62.
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deep."'188 Lehman went bankrupt on Monday, September 15,
2008.89
The financial system, however, did not stop unraveling and at
the heart of the turmoil were credit default swaps. Bear Stearns
had been a big dealer in them-it reportedly had more than five
thousand institutional partners with whom it had traded CDSs. 190
That was a good part of the reason it was not allowed to fail. 9'
Lehman's bankruptcy, however, caused renewed panic in the cre-
dit markets because it too had been a major dealer in CDSs. 192
The next day a prominent money-market fund, Reserve Primary,
announced it had "broken the buck"-the value of its assets had
fallen below $1 per share.193 That meant in effect that the coun-
try's short-term credit markets had frozen up.94
Soon after that the Federal Reserve Bank had to agree to loan
up to $85 billion to the giant insurance company, A.I.G., 95 whose
London office was on the hook for hundreds of billions of dollars
of CDSs protection. 96 Immediately after that, Federal Reserve
Bank Chairman Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Paulson met
with congressional leaders and reportedly told them that if they
did not pass a massive bailout bill "there might not be an econo-
my on Monday."197
Congress eventually appropriated up to $700 billion under the
bailout bill. 98 After initially planning to have those funds buy up
distressed mortgage-backed securities,'99 Bernanke and Paulson
188. Susanne Craig et al., The Weekend That Wall Street Died, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29,
2008, at Al (examining the excruciating attempts by Lehman to survive).
189. Id.
190. Cassidy, supra note 132, at 59.
191. See id.
192. The Great Untangling, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 2008, at 85.
193. Cassidy, supra note 132, at 62.
194. Joe Nocera, 36 Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2008, at Al.
195. Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer's Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at Al.
196. The Great Untangling, supra note 192, at 85. After a $62 billion loss in its fourth
quarter-the biggest quarterly loss in history-the U.S. government offered another $30
billion in assistance to AIG. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, U.S. Said to
Offer $30 Billion More to Help Insurer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, at Al.
197. Nocera, supra note 194.
198. Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic Bailout Passes As Economy Slips Further,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2008, at Al.
199. Cassidy, supra note 132, at 62.
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decided to use them instead to provide more direct liquidity to the
financial system by making direct investments in commercial
banks. 200 However, in the first months of 2009, both the country's
housing market and the financial system continued to remain in
great distress.201 One analyst estimated that the combined eco-
nomic rescue actions could cost the federal government $8.5 tril-
lion and "higher interest rates and soaring inflation will be
risks."202 Another noted about the bailouts that "[i]t's anybody's
guess what will ultimately be gained or lost .... If the recession
deepens and the markets don't heal, the losses one day could get
very large."20 3
C. The World's Biggest Ponzi Scheme
During the last weeks of 2008 came the piece de resistance of
the financial collapse. Bernard Madoff, a long time lion of Wall
Street, appeared to admit that his successful money-management
firm was "'all just one big lie"' and "'basically a giant Ponzi
scheme.' 204 Total losses from Madoffs blue-chip clientele may
amount to $50 billion.205 Madoff's firm incredibly reported steady
gains of approximately one percent each month for over twenty
200. Jon Hilsenrath, The Key Numbers Behind the Bailouts, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2008,
at A3.
201. Editorial, The Government and the Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at WK9. The
N.Y. Times made this telling comment about the precarious position of major banks like
Citigroup and Bank of America: "Rescue measures have so far prevented a system-wide
meltdown, but they have not reversed the downward slide or revived bank lending." Id.
As another commentator described the dismal situation,
We now have a giant margin call and painful deleveraging following the
mother of all credit cycles. The resulting widespread insolvency in financial
institutions was magnified by the over-the-counter derivatives subject to
counterparty risk creating uncertainty about who was or might quickly be-
come insolvent. The tardy Treasury and Fed recognition, ad hoc bailouts, and
letting Lehman fail added confusion. Private capital fled and even interbank
lending froze.
Michael Boskin, Investors Want Clarity Before They Take Risks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23,
2009, at A15.
202. Jim Puzzanghera, Bailout: Pay Now, Worry Later, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, at
Al.
203. Hilsenrath, supra note 200.
204. Diana B. Henriques & Zachery Kouwe, Prominent Trader Accused of Defrauding
Clients, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at Al.
205. Diana B. Henriques & Alex Berenson, The 17th Floor, Where Wealth Went to Va-
nish, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2008, at Al. For a good description of how Madoff fleeced the
members of an exclusive club, see Ian Urbina, A Palm Beach Enclave, Stunned by an In-
side Job, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2008, at B1.
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years, never once suffering a loss. 20 Even investors who should
have known that such returns were too good to be true, like Hen-
ry Kaufman, the former chief economist of Salomon Brothers,
placed some of their funds with Madoff.20 7
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox was forced to admit that his
agency had received "credible and specific" allegations about the
scheme for a decade.208 One such complainant, Harry Markopolos,
a former officer with a Boston investment company, had been try-
ing for nine years to explain to the SEC how 'Madoff Securities is
the world's largest Ponzi Scheme. ''209 It seems even some of Ma-
doffs investors may have sensed that he was not on the level but
did not want to end an operation that was profiting them.210
The episode represented another black eye for the SEC, a once
well-reputed agency renowned for its diligence and integrity.21" ' As
one Congressman said angrily, "'We now know that our securities
regulators have not only missed opportunities to protect investors
against massive losses from the most complex financial instru-
ments like derivatives, they have also missed the chance to pro-
tect them from the simplest of scams, the Ponzi scheme.'' 2 2
Commentators speculated that the SEC's zeal had been com-
promised by reluctance to take any actions that might undermine
short-term profitability in the stock market.213 Worse yet, its staff
could be going easy on Wall Street because so many of them were
planning to leave the agency to take high-paying jobs with its
firms. 214 Data also confirmed that the number of criminal prosecu-
206. Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor: How Bernie Madoff Made Smart Folks Look
Dumb, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2008, at B1.
207. Jenny Strasburg, The Madoff Fraud Case: 'Dr. Doom' Didn't Predict Madoff Blo-
wup, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2008, at C1.
208. Editorial, You Mean That Bernie Madoff?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at A44.
Madofrs firm was investigated at least eight times by the SEC and other regulators over
the years, but they never caught his fraud. Kara Scannell, Madoff Chasers Dug for Years,
to No Avail, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at C1.
209. Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, Op-Ed., The End of the Financial World As We
Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at WK9.
210. Id.
211. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Image Suffers in a String of Setbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2008, at B6.
212. Edmund L. Andrews & David Stout, SEC Accused of Failing to Follow Madoff
Warnings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009 (quoting Rep. Paul Kanjorski).
213. Lewis & Einhorn, supra note 209, at WK9.
214. Id.
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tions for stock fraud have dropped off precipitously in recent
years .215
V. THE REFORMS OF THE 1930S DID NOT Go FAR ENOUGH
A. Antecedents of the Federal Statutes
As was put cleverly by the great securities scholar Louis Loss,
the landmark federal legislation of the 1930s "did not spring full
grown from the brow of any New Deal Zeus,"216 but took much of
its inspiration from the then-current version of Great Britain's
Companies Act, 217 which "was a pattern of enforcing a certain
amount of disclosure going considerably beyond the negative in-
junction against fraud."218
Although there had been calls in the U.S. for national regula-
tion of the securities markets even back into the 19th century,219
the initial legislation in that area came from the states. Kansas, a
stronghold of populist sentiment before World War I,220 led the
way in 1911 by enacting the first of the "blue sky" laws, which
were given that name because their purpose was to check promo-
215. Eric Lichtblau, Federal Cases of Stock Fraud Drop Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25,
2008, at Al.
216. LOuIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (4th
ed. 2001).
217. LouIs Loss & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 18 (1958).
218. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 216, at 3.
219. In America, industrialization got going in earnest in the decades after the Civil
War, with much of the capital coming from middle class investors. Although the nation
experienced prodigious economic expansion then, two downturns, the panics of 1873 and
1907, produced substantial losses for investors believed to be engineered to some extent by
the notorious 'robber barons" of that era. See generally JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN EMPIRE
OF WEALTH: THE EPIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC POWER 223-28 (2004).
In 1902 the U.S. Industrial Commission concluded in a report to Congress, "'[t]here
seems to be no doubt that in many instances the promoters of combinations have been able
to unload large blocks of stock at prices far above their values, as shown by later expe-
rience.'" Seligman, supra note 3, at 19.
After the Panic of 1907, President Teddy Roosevelt asked Congress for federal legisla-
tion "to prevent at least the grosser forms of gambling in securities and commodities, such
as making large sales of what men do not possess and "cornering" the market.'" Steve
Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 385, 396 (1990).
220. For a contemporary twist on early twentieth century populism in Kansas, see gen-
erally THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE
HEART OF AMERICA (2004).
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ters who were so barefaced that they would "sell building lots in
the blue sky in fee simple. 2
1
The Kansas Act required that anyone selling securities there
must first receive a permit from the state's bank commissioner
who had broad discretion not to issue one if he did not approve of
the merits of the offering.222 In just two years, twenty-three states
followed Kansas's lead with a large number of them modeling
their securities law on Kansas's theory of "merit" regulation.223 All
told, in the two decades before the Great Depression, almost
every state enacted some form of securities regulation. 224
B. The Battle of the Philosophies
The stock market crash of 1929 and the resulting Great De-
pression, however, provided the final impetus for the passage of
federal financial regulation.225 When President Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt took office in March 1933 he found the nation's economy in
a state of almost total collapse. He put the cause bluntly in his
inaugural address:
[T]here must be an end to a conduct in banking and in business
which too often has given to a sacred trust the likeness of callous and
selfish wrongdoing .... [Tihere must be a strict supervision of all
221. Thomas Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. TIMES 37, 37 (1916). For an interesting
commentary that the purpose of Kansas's blue sky law had as much to do with protecting
local banks from competition as in safeguarding investors from fraud, see Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 351 (1991).
See also Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing Hypo-
theses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229, 230 (2003) (arguing that the influence of small banks was
most striking in states that adopted merit review standards).
222. The Kansas Bank Commissioner could deny a permit when, among other reasons,
the offering contained provisions that were "unfair, unjust, inequitable, or oppressive to
any class of contributors" or the company did "not intend to do a fair and honest business,
and in his judgment [did] not promise a fair return on the stocks, bonds or other securities
... it offered for sale," 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 212. The driving force behind the Kansas Act
was one J.N. Dolley, the state's bank commissioner. As one commentator has noted, "Dol-
ley's efforts, both in Kansas and throughout the country, combined with the economic con-
ditions of the time and pervasive public revulsion against fraudulent securities practices,
helped blue-sky legislation gain national attention." Stefania A. Di Trolio, Public Choice
Theory, Federalism, and the Sunny Side to Blue-Sky Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1279, 1285 (2004).
223. Loss & COWETT, supra note 217, at 10.
224. Id. at 17.
225. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 216, at 28.
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banking and credits and investments; there must be an end to specu-
lation with other people's money.
226
The passage of an act to regulate the sale of securities thus be-
came a central focal point of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
first one hundred days, aimed at restoring confidence in the na-
tion's economy. At that time there was a "wide demand" for the
creation of a government agency that would have controlled, "not
only the manner in which securities could be issued but the very
right of any enterprise to tap the capital market."227
The original draft of that legislation, following the states' ex-
ample, was premised on a merit standard. It provided for the re-
vocation of an issuer's registration upon a finding that "the en-
terprise or business of the issuer, or person, or the security is not
based upon sound principles, and that the revocation is in the in-
terest of the public welfare," or that the issuer "is in any other
way dishonest" or "in unsound condition or insolvent."22 Given
the interstate nature of business, the blue sky laws proved inade-
quate to protect investors from fraud.2 9 The original draft of the
proposed federal legislation, however, went beyond the state's ex-
isting powers "in lodging extensive powers to control the issuance
and sale of securities in the federal government." 3 °
President Roosevelt shied away from such a comprehensive ap-
proach. In a message to Congress early in this legislative process
he said that the federal government should not take any action as
"approving or guaranteeing" the soundness of any issuances of se-
curities.' Instead, he promoted a regime where every issue "shall
be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no es-
sentially important element attending the issue shall be con-
cealed from the buying public." 232
226. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), available
at www.bartleby.com/124/pres49.html.
227. James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959).
228. S. 875 & H.R. 4314, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. §§ 6(c), (e), (f) (1933), reprinted in 3
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934, at Item 28 & 22, at 13 (1973).
229. Di Trolio, supra note 222, at 1289-90.
230. Landis, supra note 227, at 31.
231. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
232. Id.
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Professor Raymond S. Moley, the reputed head of President
Roosevelt's "Brain Trust," then asked Harvard Law Professor
(and later Supreme Court Justice) Felix Frankfurter to draft a
revision to the original bill.233 Frankfurter was a prot6g6 of then-
Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis234 who was well-
respected for his public interest advocacy and known for his
theory of regulating business by compelling disclosure of all its
significant aspects. It was an approach he summed up in this
memorable aphorism from his book on investment fraud, Other
People's Money: "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman. ''231
Professor Frankfurter assembled a team of young legal scho-
lars who produced a new draft in a whirlwind weekend session. 236
A distinguished member of that group, James M. Landis, later
described how Frankfurter's version, which adopted the disclo-
sure theory of regulation,237 required the filing of a registration
statement2 38 and a waiting period before the securities could be
sold.239 While the legislation did not give the federal government
the authority to pass on the investment quality of the offering, an
overseeing commission would be granted the power to keep issues
off the market if the data in the registration statement were in-
adequate or false.240 After some legislative vetting, the bill quickly
passed both houses of Congress and was signed into law by Presi-
dent Roosevelt on May 27, 1933.241
233. Landis, supra note 227, at 33.
234. On the Brandeis-Frankfurter relationship, see BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE
BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL ACTmTIES OF TWO
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1982).
235. LOuIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT, 92
(1914). For the continuing relevance of Justice Brandeis views to today's economic crisis,
see supra note 165.
236. Landis, supra note 227, at 33-34.
237. Id. at 34-35.
238. Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006).
239. Securities Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a).
240. Landis, supra note 227, at 34-35. Provisions for criminal and civil liability were
also included to make sure that corporate officials would be honest and forthright with
their investors. See Securities Act §§ 11, 15, 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, 77o, 77x.
241. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb.
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C. Inadequate from Its Inception
As one commentator wryly described the disclosure orientation
of the federal act, "a promoter may ask the public to invest in a
hole in the ground so long as he does not describe it as a uranium
strike without supporting geological data."242 It was this minimal-
ist approach that provoked an immediate rejoinder from another
future Supreme Court Justice, William 0. Douglas, who was then
a law professor at Yale. While he approved of the legislation as
"symbolic of a shift of political power.., from the bankers to the
masses; from the promoter to the investor ,"' 243 Douglas also cha-
racterized the Act as "a nineteenth-century piece of legislation."2 4
What was needed in the regulation of corporate finance, he said,
was "a more thoroughgoing and comprehensive control."2 5
For Douglas, "Truth in Securities" was not enough, because he
foresaw that investors would either not understand it or, even
worse, would be so taken with speculative concerns that they
would find it irrelevant. 6 Douglas's ultimate concerns with the
inadequacy of the Securities Act, however, were even more tren-
chant. He saw nothing in it that would make the industry plan
and organize for the common good. Access to the capital markets,
he said, should be lodged "in the hands not only of the new self-
disciplined business groups but also in the hands of governmental
agencies whose function would be to articulate the public interest
with the profit motive."2 7
D. Concurrent Jurisdiction and Its Virtual Repeal
While the Securities Act established a separate federal system
of securities regulation based on the disclosure model, it took
pains not to preempt the states' jurisdiction there. 24 18 As one fed-
242. LOSS & COWETT, supra note 217, at 36-37.
243. Douglas, supra note 8, at 522.
244. Id. at 529.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 526-27.
247. Id. at 531.
248. As former Section 18 of the Securities Act provided, "Nothing in this title shall
affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission . . . of any State or Territory of the
United States, or the District of Columbia, over any security or any person." Securities Act
of 1933, ch. 38, § 18, 48 Stat. 74, 85 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2000)).
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eral official testified, the saving clause would "'assure the states
that the [Securities Act] was not an attempt to supplant their
laws, but an attempt to supplement their laws and to assist them
in enforcing their laws in those cases where they have no con-
trol.'249 For over sixty years, therefore, the blue sky laws coex-
isted with the federal act giving our country a dual regime of se-
curities regulation.210
Over time, however, criticism that this system was duplicative
and unduly burdensome to the process of capital formation
mounted. 2 1 Efforts were made to minimize that problem by coor-
dinating the various systems of the states with each other and
with the SEC's system.212 With a change in political control of
Congress, however, the federal legislature in 1996 drastically cut
back on the reach of the blue sky laws by substantially preempt-
ing their operation.253
Not only did the new law confirm a long-standing state practice
that issuances of securities listed on a national exchange be ex-
cluded from registration,254 it even precluded the states from any
review of offerings that were exempt as federal private place-
ments under the SEC's Regulation D.251 As a result, the states
maintained review power over only the smallest and most limited
offerings.256
249. Di Trolio, supra note 222, at 1293 (quoting Federal Securities Act: Hearing Before
the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4314, 73d Cong. 116-17 (1933)
(statement of Ollie M. Butler, Foreign Service Div., Dep't of Commerce)).
250. During that time in 1956, the Uniform Securities Act was promulgated and be-
came the basis for the blue sky laws of many states. Id. at 1293-94.
251. That criticism was aptly summarized in Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections
on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495, 498.
(1984). See also Conference Report on National Securities Markets Improvement Act of
1996, H.R. REP. 104-864, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91 85,847 at 88,650 (1996).
252. This included the promulgating of a Uniform Limited Offering Exemption. See
generally HAZEN, supra note 31, at 322-23.
253. This occurred in the passage of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
254. Securities Act § 18(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A) (2006).
255. Securities Act § 18(b)(4), 15 U.S.C.§ 77r(b)(4)(A).
256. See HAZEN, supra note 31, at 324.
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VI. THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
A. Woulda, Coulda, Shoulda
Our financial system collapsed in 2008 owing in large part to
the opaque and exotic derivative instruments that had come to
dominate our capital markets .2 1 Although almost all of those
were sold as unregistered, exempt securities,15 it is hard to see
how our current regime of requiring mere disclosure would have
forestalled their issuance or protected the investors who eagerly
snapped them up. It is tempting therefore to speculate whether
the alternative approach that Justice Douglas and others pro-
posed would have worked better.
What if President Roosevelt and Congress had followed
through with the original proposed legislation that gave a federal
agency the power to prohibit the sale of securities not based on
"sound principles"?259 Guardians of the public interest would then
have been able to scrutinize the CDOs that completely discon-
nected the ultimate lenders from the original borrowers.
They would then have found that the CDOs were tantamount
to a Ponzi scheme since they would only have value in a real es-
tate market whose escalation never ended. 260 Likewise, the finan-
cial institutions that entered into credit default swaps to insure
those instruments would have been precluded from creating a
"daisy chain" of enormous leveraged liability.261
Federal officials then could have prohibited the sale of securi-
ties because they were not based on "sound principles" and their
sale would endanger the public interest. The discretion thus af-
257. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 38-71 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. Warren Buffett has picked up on
this metaphor comparing the recklessness of financial companies with those who spread
venereal disease. As he wrote in a recent newsletter about the spread of this toxic liability,
"[I]t's not just whom you sleep with' but also 'whom they'--unnamed huge financial insti-
tutions-'are sleeping with.'" Frank Rich, Some Things Don't Change in Grover's Corners,
N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 8, 2009, at WK 11 (emphasis added).
Rich continued the analogy: The financial firms like Citibank and Goldman Sachs
.spread V.D. with esoteric derivatives, then hudged their wild gambles with A.I.G. 'insur-
ance' (credit-default swaps) that proved to be the most porous prophylactics in the history
of finance." Id.
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forded to those authorities would have been similar to that exer-
cised by state officials under the "fair, just, and equitable" stan-
dards.
In light of the abysmal failure of the current system, regulatory
reform requires another look at merit review. How feasible would
it be at the national level? Part of the answer to that question lies
in an examination of how workable it was when used by the
states.
B. Merit Review by the States Was Effective
Until virtual federal repeal of their review authority, blue sky
officials were consistent in their contentions that merit regulation
provided substantial protection to investors and bolstered the in-
tegrity of the capital markets in their states. As one state com-
missioner put it, "[O]ur files in Michigan and undoubtedly the
files in most other states, are replete with cases where securities
applications were withdrawn or never filed because of objections
involving soundness or fairness and where the issuer subsequent-
ly met financial disaster."262
An American Bar Association subcommittee that reported on
state merit regulation in the 1980s found that it was "an ambi-
tious attempt to redefine the relations of promoters and public
investors. '263 It assumed that both market forces and private ac-
tors such as underwriters were unable to affect the structure of
the issue because of the sway promoters and brokers hold over
the often credulous expectations of investors.264 In addition, state
merit review was premised on the belief that disclosure alone was
insufficient. 265 Most often, the disclosure document was not read
by investors. 266 Even if investors read it, they found it incompre-
hensible or gave it little effect in their decisions . 2 6 Defenders of
state regulation, the study found, believed that the fairness of an
262. Warren, supra note 251, at 529 n.282 (quoting Hueni, the former Director of Mich-
igan's Securities Bureau, Department of Commerce).
263. Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities
Comm., Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785, 830
(1985-1986).
264. Id. at 851.
265. Id. at 829-30.
266. Id. at 830.
267. Id.
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offering could be judged by "conscientious, experienced, and im-
partial administrators."2 68 Merit regulation, accordingly, estab-
lished "market norms that benefit[ed] the economy and the public
generally."269
Professor Louis Loss and his colleagues at Harvard Law School
did extensive field work in the mid-1950s on the actual operations
and practices of the blue sky officials. 270 In the decade after World
War II, there had been a "tremendous growth in the securities
business."271 In almost all the states, Loss observed blue sky offic-
es that were "far too small and too loosely organized to allow a
full administration of the statutes."272 Given those realities, as
well as the loosely-worded mandates empowering those officials,
Loss found that even fifty years ago "a substantial degree of ad-
ministrative flexibility is essential in regulating a feature of mod-
ern life which is as complex as the world of securities. '273
Yet despite running departments that were "understaffed and
underpaid," Loss hailed the "relative workability of the statutes,"
and the "common-sense approach" that the blue sky officials took
in working with lawyers for issuers.27 1 To a large extent, this re-
quired devising various "rules of thumb" and taking a holistic ap-
proach to judging the fitness of an offering. 2  Drawing on his own
experience, no doubt, Loss analogized that the process was at
least as effective and honest as a law professor who reads an ex-
am answer and then, without further ado, puts a grade on it.276
C. A National Platform for Merit Review
How workable would such an approach be today at the national
level? Skepticism is warranted here. The SEC's limited resources
are well-known,277 and its inadequate response to our financial
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Loss & COWErr, supra note 217, at v.
271. Id. at 57.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 63.
274. Id. at 45.
275. Id. at 67-68.
276. Id. at 68.
277. As three former chairmen of the SEC wrote recently, "The problem with the S.E.C.
today is that it lacks the money, manpower and tools it needs to do its job." William Do-
naldson, Arthur Levitt, Jr. & David Ruder, Muzzling the Watchdog, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 29,
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scandals is disturbingly well documented.2 78 For some time, it has
not performed even a limited review of all registration statements
that are filed with it.27 9 Even that meager protection for investors
was undercut by the wide-ranging exemptions to registration that
have been carved out over the last quarter century.280
Yet with rueful hindsight we can only wish that some type of
scrutiny would have been applied to the exotic and opaque finan-
cial instruments that grew up during the last two decades that go
by the name of securitized assets.28' The Commission, however,
was not only precluded from exercising any control over the me-
rits of those issuances, but also prohibited from reviewing them,
even on a disclosure basis, because they were structured to quali-
fy as exempt from registration.28 2
The only guarantees of their bona fides that purported to be
independent from their promoters were furnished by agencies
that supposedly judged their credit worthiness. 28 3 Yet investiga-
tions have revealed that many of those firms were so compro-
mised that their opinions failed to adequately reflect the risks of
the financial instruments they rated."'
VII. CONCLUSION
As President Obama's Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel said re-
cently of the financial meltdown, "'You never want a serious crisis
to go to waste'.. .. 1285 Since that situation became a full-blown
economic collapse in the fall of 2008, it has been apparent that
the nation needs new, stronger laws regulating its financial mar-
2008, at A19.
278. See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
279. Since the SEC does not have the resources to examine all registration statements,
it engages in selective review of those and other documents filed with it. Registration
statements filed by first-time issuers get a full review and other filings are selected for
scrutiny on an "as needed" basis. William W. Barker, SEC Registration of Public Offerings
Under the Securities Act of 1933, 52 Bus. LAW. 65, 73 (1996-1997).
280. See supra notes 38-71 and accompanying text.
281. See F. Williams Engdahl, Colossal Collateral Damage-Financial Tsunami Part
V, THE MARKET ORACLE (United Kingdom), http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article3796.
html (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
282. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
283. See Grynbaum, supra note 161.
284. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
285. David Leonhardt, The Big Fix, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at MM22.
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kets.28 6 Even former anti-regulatory hardliners like Treasury Sec-
retary Henry Paulson have become advocates for more stringent
government control of the financial markets,287 and there has been
much discussion about the need for some type of "supercop" to
oversee the entire sector of financial services. 288
During this national discussion and debate, policymakers
should focus on granting the SEC, or whoever ends up as the
country's ultimate financial czar, the power to review the merits
of securities offerings. Professor Elizabeth Warren of Harvard
Law School has proposed similar legislation along those lines. 2
9 It
would authorize a federal agency to flat-out prohibit the sale of
certain investments that pose undue risks to our entire economic
system. Events have also confirmed Warren Buffett's apt descrip-
tion of credit derivatives as "'financial weapons of mass destruc-
tion' 2 90 and such an approach would prohibit like instruments
from wreaking havoc in the future.
The strongest objection to vesting such control in the govern-
ment, however, may come from the current, sorry history of regu-
latory failure. 29' Why should an agency be entrusted with that
power when the SEC's recent failures to protect investors have
been so glaring? The point is well taken, but during most of its
seventy-five-year history, the SEC has been quite successful in
"maintaining investor confidence, helping to make our markets
the envy of the world."292 There is no reason why a reinvigorated
286. As the Wall Street Journal succinctly put it, "The government is about to rewrite
the rules for the nation's financial markets." Paletta & Scannell, supra note 158.
287. Julia Werdigier, Paulson Calls for Giving Regulators More Powers, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 2008, at C2.
288. See Jackie Calmes, Both Sides of the Aisle See More Regulation, and Not Just of
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A15; Arthur Levitt, How to Restore Confidence in Our
Markets, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2008, at A15.
289. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY 8, 9 (2007), available at
http://www.democracyjournal.orglarticle.php?ID=6528 (proposing a Financial Product
Safety Commission to test and implement alternative forms of regulations); see also Eliza-
beth Warren & Amelia Warren Tyagi, Protect Financial Consumers, HARPER'S MAGAZINE,
Nov. 2008, at 39.
290. Buffett made those remarks describing securities backed by subprime mortgages
and the turmoil they have wrought on the credit markets. See supra note 170 and accom-
panying text.
291. See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
292. The comment is from Arthur Levitt, a former chairman of the SEC. Levitt, supra
note 288.
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agency, one with the powers it needs to fully protect the public in-
terest, could not accomplish that important mission once again.293
Faith in the integrity of our capital markets is essential if
businesses are to receive the funding they need from investors.29 4
European governments are pushing for similar regulatory re-
forms,'95 and prosperity in our global economy depends on such
uniformly honest financial systems. Back in 1933, the first draft
of the Securities Act was correct when it would have disallowed
the sale of securities that are not "based upon sound principles. ' '296
The New Dealers unfortunately settled for an inadequate re-
sponse in that landmark legislation, and current policymakers
should set the matter right.
293. The original New Deal brought many young people to government eager to ad-
vance the public interest. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN 257 (1974).
Commentators have found the same spirit alive again. New York Times columnist Thomas
Friedman quoted Michael Sandel speaking of the common good: "It must also be about a
new patriotism-about what it means to be a citizen.'" Sandel goes on to say, "'Obama's
campaign tapped a dormant civic idealism, a hunger among Americans to serve a cause
greater than themselves, a yearning to be citizens again.'" Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed.,
Finishing Our Work, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A35.
294. Steven Abernathy, The Coefficient of Greed, DAILY DEAL (New York, N.Y.), Mar.
14, 2002.
295. Paletta & Scannell, supra note 158.
296. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
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